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ARGUMENT
Wulff's Argument That Precedents Holding Implied Consent Is A Valid Exception
To The Warrant Requirement Should Be Overruled Is Without Merit
The district court erred when it reasoned that because there is no "bright
line" exigency exception allowing warrantless blood draws there can be no
implied consent. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3-5.) Wulff does not directly defend the
district court's reasoning, but instead invokes the "unconditional conditions
doctrine,,,1 asserting that consent may not be implied as a condition of driving on
Idaho's roads or other public places.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 5-13.)

Wulff,

however, has cited no authority that would prohibit implied consent under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and review of that doctrine shows that it is
inapplicable to implied consent as set forth in the Idaho Code.
"Under the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right ... in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government .... " Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interestsespecially, his interest in freedom of speech.

"Unconditional conditions" is an oxymoron. The correct name of this doctrine is
the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine," which "vindicates the Constitution's
enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into
giving them up." Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., _
U.S.
_ , 133 S.Ct. 25862594 (2013) (emphasis added).
1

1

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); see also Farnworth v.
Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 285, 869 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1994). Thus, for example,
the government does not have the "power to compel a private carrier to assume
against his will the duties and burdens of a common carrier," which compulsion
violates due process, as a "condition precedent to the enjoyment of a privilege"
of a business license. Frost v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 592-94
(1926). Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Idaho Supreme
Court has applied this doctrine to invalidate implied consent laws.

To the

contrary, both courts have specifically held that implied consent laws are valid.
See,

~,

North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho

300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007).

Wulff makes two arguments for

extending the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invalidate implied consent,
neither of which have merit.

2

Wulff argues that other courts have applied the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to reject implied consent.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 8-13.)

shows that this argument is, at best, overstated.

Review

In all of the cases cited the

courts suppressed blood draws taken in an absence of probable cause to
believe the driver was under the influence. State v. Quinn, 178 P.3d 1190 (Az.

2 Despite his request that this Court overrule precedent, Wulff fails to cite the
standard for doing so. Controlling precedent must be followed "unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
unle~~rl,Jlingit is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768
(2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000)
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978,
983 (1990)).

2

App. 2008) (statute allowing blood draw because of involvement in serious
accident struck down); Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003) (same);
Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. App. 2003) (officers lacked probable
cause to believe driver was under the influence).

Wulff has cited to no case that

has applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to strike down an implied
consent statute such as Idaho's, which requires "reasonable grounds to believe"
the driver was under the influence. I.C. § 18-8002(1 ).3
Review of the cases cited does not demonstrate that implied consent,
validated by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United
States, is an "unconstitutional condition." Rather, the courts' holdings that the
Constitution does not countenance implied consent in the absence of reason to
believe that the driver is under the influence does not advance Wulff's argument
because there was probable cause in this case to believe Wulff was driving
under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp. 101-02.) At least one case from one of
those jurisdictions, unrecognized by Wulff, says as much. See Hough v. State,
620 S.E.2d 380, 383-84 (Ga. 2005) (distinguishing Cooper and holding that
implied consent is constitutional where officers have probable cause to believe
driver is under the influence).

The necessity of particularized suspIcion is a primary difference between
express consent and implied consent. Express consent can be given in the
absence of any suspicion, while implied consent requires "reasonable grounds to
believe." Properly understood, implied consent is merely an implied waiver of
having a judge determine probable cause before, as opposed to after, the blood
draw is performed, not a complete waiver of applicable Fourth Amendment
rights.
3

3

Wulff also argues that implied consent "was not considered to afoul [sic]
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine due to the fact that under pre-McNeely
jurisprudence it was believed that an individual held no constitutional right to be
free from warrantless blood draws."

(Respondent's brief, p. 7 (citations

omitted).)

Wulff's assertion that the implied consent exception justified

warrantless

blood

draws only because the

exigency exception justified

warrantless blood draws is both nonsensical and directly contrary to this Court's
analysis in Diaz.

"Because Diaz had already given his implied consent to

evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a
blood draw. Without addressing whether exigency also justified the blood draw,
we hold that the seizure of Diaz's blood fell within a well-recognized exception to
the warrant requirement."

ill:

at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. Thus, in Diaz, the blood

draw was justified by the implied consent exception regardless of whether it was
also justified by the exigency exception.

The argument that implied consent

justifies a warrantless blood draw only if exigent circumstances also justifies the
warrantless blood draw is meritless.
The Idaho Supreme Court has upheld implied consent as a valid
exception to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also upheld implied consent
statutes against constitutional attack.

Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112

(1983); North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
_

In Missouri v. McNeely,

U.S. _ , 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1565-66 (2013), the Court endorsed implied

consent as a valid law enforcement tool.

4

The district court erred when it

concluded that implied consent was not a valid exception to the warrant
requirement.
The district court erred by concluding that the Supreme Court of the
United States, by declining to apply a bright line rule that exigent circumstances
always justify a warrantless blood draw for BAC testing, eliminated implied
consent as a viable exception to the warrant requirement. This holding is directly
contrary to precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court and not justified by any
precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States. The district court erred,
and must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The state requests this Court to reverse the district court's order granting
suppression and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 21 st day of March, 20 3.

KENNETH K. JOR~ENt.sEN
Deputy Attorney General
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